Unstable embodiments: a phenomenological interpretation of patient satisfaction with treatment outcome.
Many patients experience aspects of treatment and care as dehumanizing because the body is considered separate from the self and its life context. An attempt to transcend viewing persons in dualistic terms is posed by phenomenologists who focus not on "the body" as such but on what it means to be "embodied." In this paper, we review the relevance of the phenomenology of the body for health care and report the results of comparing Sally Gadow's phenomenological insights about body-self unity with a qualitative analysis of patients' accounts of satisfaction with the outcome of hand surgery. We illustrate the ways in which our findings were and were not congruent with Gadow's conceptualization of embodiment and highlight aspects that are ambiguous. We conclude that the body-self dialectical relationship should be recast as a body-self-society trialectic and discuss the implications of this new conceptualization for clinical practices.